Natural Law: or the Science of Justice: A Treatise on Natural Law, Natural Justice, Natural Rights, Natural Liberty, and Natural Society; showing that all Legislation whatsoever is an Absurdity, a Usurpation, and a Crime.
By
Lysander Spooner. (1882).
Edited
by Tim Wingate Th.D. This version is
faithful to the original text with some rearranging, clarifying, and updating
to 21st Century language, grammar, and syntax.
THE SCIENCE OF JUSTICE PART 1
Section I.
Justice --- is the science of all human rights; of all a man's rights of person and property; of all his rights
to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
·
It is the science that alone can
tell any man what he can, and cannot, do; what he can, and cannot, have; what
he can, and cannot, say, without infringing the rights of any other person.
·
It is the science of peace; and
the only science of peace; since it is the science that alone can tell us under
what conditions mankind can live in peace, or ought to live in peace, with each
other.
Men living in contact with each other cannot avoid learning
Natural Law, to a very great extent, even if they would. The dealings of men
with men, their separate possessions and their individual wants, and the
disposition of every man to demand, and insist upon, whatever he believes to be
his due, and to resent and resist all invasions of what he believes to be his
rights, are continually forcing upon their minds the questions, Is this act
just? or is it unjust? Is this thing mine? or is it his? These are questions of
Natural Law; questions which, in regard to the great mass of cases, are
answered alike by the human mind everywhere. [1]
Children learn the fundamental principles of Natural Law at a
very early age. Thus they very early understand that one child must not,
without just cause, strike or otherwise hurt, another; that one child must not
assume any arbitrary control or domination over another; that one child must
not, either by force, deceit, or stealth, obtain possession of anything that
belongs to another; that if one child commits any of these wrongs against
another, it is not only the right of the injured child to resist, and, if need
be, punish the wrongdoer, and compel him to make reparation, but that it
is also the right, and the moral duty, of all other children, and all other
persons, to assist the injured party in defending his rights, and redressing
his wrongs.
These are fundamental principles of Natural Law, which govern
the most important transactions of man with man. Yet, children learn them
earlier than they learn that three and three are six, or five and five ten.
Their childish plays, even, could not be carried on without a constant regard
for them; and it is equally impossible for persons of any age to live together
in peace under any other conditions.
It would be no extravagance to say that, in most cases, if not
in all, mankind at large, young and old, learn this Natural Law long before
they have learned the meanings of the words by which we describe it. In truth,
it would be impossible to make them understand the real meanings of the words,
if they did not understand the nature of the thing itself. To make them
understand the meanings of the words justice and injustice before knowing the
nature of the things themselves, would be as impossible as it would be to make
them understand the meanings of the words heat and cold, wet and dry, light and
darkness, white and black, one and two, before knowing the nature of the things
themselves. Men necessarily must know sentiments and ideas, no less
than material things, before they can know the meanings of the words by which
we describe them.
These conditions are simply these:
1. First, that each man shall do, towards every other, all that
justice requires him to do; as, for example, that he shall pay his debts, that
he shall return borrowed or stolen property to its owner, and that he shall
make reparation for any injury he may have done to the person or property of
another.
2. Second, that each man shall abstain from doing so another,
anything which justice forbids him to do; as, for example, that he shall
abstain from committing theft, robbery, arson, murder, or any other crime
against the person or property of another.
So long as these conditions are fulfilled, men are at peace, and
ought to remain at peace, with each other. Nevertheless, when either of these
conditions is violated, men are at war. Moreover, they must necessarily remain
at war until justice is re-established. Throughout all time, so far as history
informs us, wherever mankind has attempted to live in peace with each other,
both the natural instincts, and the collective wisdom of the human race, have
acknowledged and prescribed, as an indispensable condition, obedience to this
one only universal obligation: that each should live honestly towards
every other.
The ancient maxim makes the sum of a man's legal duty to his
fellow men to be simply this: "To live honestly, to hurt no one, to
give to everyone his due."
This entire maxim is really expressed in the single words, to
live honestly; since to live honestly is to hurt no one, and give to
everyone his due.
Justice is a Natural Principle of Natural Law!
Justice as a natural principle, is necessarily an immutable
one; and can no more be changed --- by any power inferior to that
which established it --- than can the law of gravitation, the laws of
light, the principles of mathematics, or any other Natural Law or principle
whatever; and all attempts or assumptions, on the part of any man or body of
men --- whether calling themselves governments, or by any other
name --- to set up their own commands, wills, pleasure, or
discretion, in the place of justice, as a rule of conduct for any human being,
are as much an absurdity, an usurpation, and a tyranny, as would be their
attempts to set up their own commands, wills, pleasure, or discretion in the
place of any and all the physical, mental, and moral laws of the universe.
Section II.
Justice as a natural principle of Natural Law; is a matter of
science, to be learned and applied like any other science. Therefore, to talk
of either adding to, or taking from, it, by legislation, is just as false,
absurd, and ridiculous as it would be to talk of adding to, or taking from, mathematics,
chemistry, or any other science, by legislation.
Section III.
Justice as a natural principle of Natural Law; results in that
nothing can be added to, or taken from, its supreme authority by all the
legislation of which the entire human race united are capable. All the attempts
of the human race, or of any portion of it, to add to, or take from, the
supreme authority of justice, in any case, whatever, is of no more obligation
upon any single human being than is the idle wind.
Section IV.
Justice as a natural principle of Natural Law; is the principle,
or law, that tells us what rights were given to every human being at his birth;
what rights are, therefore, inherent in him as a human being, necessarily
remain with him during life; and, however capable of being trampled upon, are
incapable of being blotted out, extinguished, annihilated, or separated or
eliminated from his nature as a human being, or deprived of their inherent
authority or obligation.
Section V.
Justice as a natural principle of Natural Law; it is necessarily
the highest, and consequently the only and universal, law for all those matters
to which it is naturally applicable. And, consequently, all human legislation
is simply and always an assumption of authority and dominion, where no right of
authority or dominion exists. It is, therefore, simply and always an intrusion,
an absurdity, an usurpation, and a crime.
Section VI.
Justice as a natural principle of Natural Law; requires the
principle of honesty, such principles as men's natural rights of person and
property, then we have an immutable and universal law; a law that we can learn,
as we learn any other science; a law that tells us what is just and what is
unjust, what is honest and what is dishonest, what things are mine and what
things are yours, what are my rights of person and property, and what are your
rights of person and property, and where is the boundary between each and all
of my rights of person and property and each and all of your rights of person
and property.
This law is the paramount law, and the same law,
over all the world, at all times, and for all peoples; and will be the same
paramount and only law, at all times, and for all peoples, so long as man shall
live upon the earth.
Section VII.
Justice as a natural principle of Natural Law is a science of
justice without which there can be no science of government; and all the
rapacity and violence, by which, in all ages and nations, a few confederated
villains have obtained the mastery over the rest of mankind, reduced them to
poverty and slavery, and established what they called governments to keep them
in subjection, have been as legitimate examples of government as any that the
world is ever to see.
Section VIII.
Justice as a natural principle of
Natural Law is necessarily the only political principle
there ever was, or ever will be; all the other so-called political principles,
which men are in the habit of inventing, are not principles at all. They are either the mere conceits of
simpletons, who imagine they have discovered something better than truth, and
justice, and universal law; or they are mere devices and pretenses, to which
selfish and knavish men resort as means to get fame, power, and money.
However:
If justice is not a natural
principle of Natural Law, then every human being came into the world utterly
destitute of rights; and coming into the world destitute of rights, he must
necessarily forever remain so. For if no one brings any rights with him into
the world, clearly, no one can ever have any rights of his own, or give any to
another. And the consequence would be that mankind could never have any rights;
and for them to talk of any such things as their rights, would be to talk of
things that never had, never will have, and never can have any existence.
If justice is not a natural
principle of Natural Law; there can be no such thing as dishonesty; and no
possible act of either force or fraud, committed by one man against the person
or property of another, can be said to be unjust or dishonest; or be complained
of, or prohibited, or punished as such. In short, if there be no such principle
as justice, there can be no such acts as crimes; and all the professions of
governments, so-called, that they exist, either in whole or in part, for the
punishment or prevention of crimes, are professions that they exist for the
punishment or prevention of what never existed, nor ever can exist. Such
professions are therefore confessions that, so far as crimes are concerned,
governments have no occasion to exist; that there is nothing for them to do,
and that there is nothing that they can do. They are confessions that the
governments exist for the punishment and prevention of acts that are, in their
nature, simple impossibilities.
If justice is not a natural
principle of Natural Law; no such principle as honesty, no such principle as
men's natural rights of person or property, then all such words as justice and
injustice, honesty and dishonesty, all such words as mine and yours, all words
that signify that one thing is one man's property and that another thing is
another man's property, all words that are used to describe men's natural
rights of person or property, all such words as are used to describe injuries
and crimes, should be struck out of all human languages as having no meanings;
and it should be declared, at once and forever, that the greatest force and the
greatest frauds, for the time being, are the supreme and only laws for
governing the relations of men with each other; and that, from henceforth, all
persons and combinations of persons --- those that call themselves
governments, as well as all others --- are to be left free to
practice upon each other all the force, and all the fraud, of which they are
capable.
If justice is not a natural
principle of Natural Law; it is no principle at all. If it is not a natural
principle, there is no such thing as justice.
If justice is not a natural
principle of Natural Law; all that men have ever said or written about it, from
time immemorial, has been said and written about that which had no existence.
If justice is not a natural
principle of Natural Law; all the appeals for justice that have ever been
heard, and all the struggles for justice that have ever been witnessed, have
been appeals and struggles for a mere fantasy, a vagary of the imagination, and
not for a reality.
If justice is not a natural
principle of Natural Law; then there is no such thing as injustice, and all the
crimes of which the world has been the scene, have been no crimes at all. But
rather, only simple events, like the falling of the rain, or the setting of the
sun; events of which the victims had no more reason to complain than they had
to complain of the running of the streams, or the growth of vegetation.
If justice is not a natural
principle of Natural Law; governments (so-called) have no more right or reason
to take cognizance of it, or to pretend or profess to take cognizance of it,
than they have to take cognizance, or to pretend or profess to take cognizance,
of any other nonentity; and all their professions of establishing justice, or
of maintaining justice, or of rewarding justice, are simply the mere gibberish
of fools, or the frauds of imposters.
THE SCIENCE OF JUSTICE PART 2
Section I.
Man, no doubt, owes many other moral duties
to his fellow men; such as to feed the hungry, clothe the naked, shelter the
homeless, care for the sick, protect the defenseless, assist the weak, and
enlighten the ignorant. However, these are simply moral duties,
of which each man must be his own judge, in each particular case, as to
whether, and how, and how far, he can, or will, perform them. But of
his Natural Law legal duty --- that is, of his
duty to live honestly towards his fellow men --- his fellow men not
only may judge but, for their own protection, must judge.
Moreover, if need be, they may rightfully compel him to perform it. They may do
this, acting singly, or in concert. They may do it on the instant, as the
necessity arises, or deliberately and systematically if they prefer to do so,
and the exigency will admit of it.
Section II.
Although it is the right of anybody and
everybody --- of any one man, or set of men, no less than
another --- to repel injustice, and compel justice, for themselves,
and for all who may be wronged, yet to avoid the errors that are liable to
result from haste and passion, and that everybody, who desires it, may rest
secure in the assurance of protection, without a resort to force, it is
evidently desirable that men should associate, so far as they freely and voluntarily
can do so, for the maintenance of justice among themselves, and for mutual
protection against other wrong-doers.
It is also in the highest degree desirable that they should
agree upon some plan or system of judicial proceedings, which, in the trial of
causes, should secure caution, deliberation, thorough investigation, and, as
far as possible, freedom from every influence but the simple desire to do
justice. Yet, such associations can be rightful and desirable only as far as
they are purely voluntary. No man can rightfully be coerced into
joining one, or supporting one, against his will. His own interest, his own
judgment, and his own conscience alone must determine whether he will join this
association, or that; or whether he will join any. If he chooses to depend, for
the protection of his own rights, solely upon himself, and upon such voluntary
assistance as other persons may freely offer to him when the necessity for it
arises, he has a perfect right to do so.
This course would be a reasonably safe one for him to follow, so
long as he himself should manifest the ordinary readiness of mankind, in like
cases, to go to the assistance and defense of injured persons; and should also
himself "live honestly, hurt no one, and give to every one his due."
For such a man is reasonably sure of always giving friends and defenders enough
in case of need, whether he shall have joined any association, or not.
Certainly, no man can rightfully be required to join, or
support, an association whose protection he does not desire. Nor can any man be
reasonably or rightfully expected to join, or support, any association whose
plans, or method of proceeding, he does not approve, as likely to accomplish
its professed purpose of maintaining justice, and at the same time avoid
doing injustice. To join, or support one that would, in his opinion, be
inefficient, would be absurd. To join or support one that, in his opinion,
would itself do injustice would be criminal. Therefore, he must be left at the
same liberty to join, or not to join, an association for this purpose, as for
any other, according to his own interest, discretion, or conscience shall
dictate.
An association for mutual protection against injustice is like
an association for mutual protection against fire or shipwreck. And there is no
more right or reason in compelling any man to join or
support one of these associations, against his will, his judgment, or his
conscience than there is in compelling him to join or support any other, whose
benefits (if it offers any) he does not want, or whose purposes or methods he
does not approve.
Section III.
No objection can be made to these voluntary associations upon
the ground that they would lack that knowledge of justice, as a science, which
would be necessary to enable them to maintain justice, and avoid doing
injustice. Honesty, justice, and Natural Law is usually a very plain and simple
matter, easily understood by common minds. Those who desire to know what it is,
in any particular case, seldom have to go far to find it. It is true; it must
be learned, like any other science. Nevertheless, it is also true that it is
very easily learned. Although as illimitable in its applications as the
infinite relations and dealings of men with each other, it is, nevertheless, made
up of a few simple elementary principles, of the truth and justice of which
every ordinary mind has an almost intuitive perception. In addition, almost all
men have the same perceptions of what constitutes justice, or of what justice
requires, when they understand alike the facts from which their inferences are
to be drawn.
THE SCIENCE OF JUSTICE PART 3
NATURAL LAW CONTRASTED WITH LEGISLATION.
Section I.
Natural law, natural justice, being a principle that is
naturally applicable and adequate to the rightful settlement of every possible
controversy that can arise among men; being too, the only standard by which any
controversy whatever, between man and man, can be rightfully settled; being a
principle whose protection every man demands for himself, whether he is willing
to accord it to others, or not; being also an immutable principle, one that is
always and everywhere the same, in all ages and nations; being self-evidently
necessary in all times and places; being so entirely impartial and equitable
towards all; so indispensable to the peace of mankind everywhere; so vital to
the safety and welfare of every human being; being, too, so easily learned, so
generally known, and so easily maintained by such voluntary associations as all
honest men can readily and rightfully form for that purpose --- being
such a principle as this, these questions arise, viz.: Why is it that it does
not universally, or well nigh universally, prevail? Why is it that it has not,
ages ago, been established throughout the world as the one only law that any
man, or all men, could rightfully be compelled to obey? Why is it that any
human being ever conceived that anything so self-evidently superfluous, false,
absurd, and atrocious as all legislation necessarily must be, could be of any use
to mankind, or have any place in human affairs?
Section II.
The answer is, that through all historic times, wherever any
people have advanced beyond the savage state, and have learned to increase
their means of subsistence by the cultivation of soil, a greater or less
number of them have associated and organized themselves as robbers, to plunder
and enslave all others, who had either accumulated any property that could be
seized or had shown, by their labor, that they could be made to contribute to
the support or pleasure of those who should enslave them.
These bands of robbers, small in number at first, have increased
their power by uniting with each other, inventing warlike weapons, disciplining
themselves, perfecting their organizations as military forces, and dividing
their plunder (including their captives) among themselves, either in such
proportions as have been previously agreed on or in such as their leaders
(always desirous to increase the number of their followers) should prescribe.
The success of these bands of robbers was an easy thing, for the
reason that those whom they plundered and enslaved were comparatively
defenseless; being scattered thinly over the country; engaged wholly in trying,
by rude implements and heavy labor, to extort a subsistence from the soil;
having no weapons of war, other than sticks and stones; having no military
discipline or organization, and no means of concentrating their forces, or
acting in concert, when suddenly attacked. Under these circumstances, the only alternative
left them for saving even their lives, or the lives of their families, was to
yield up not only the crops they had gathered, and the lands they had
cultivated, but themselves and their families also as slaves.
Thenceforth their fate was, as slaves, to cultivate for others
the lands they had before cultivated for themselves. Being driven constantly to
their labor, wealth slowly increased, but all went into the hands of their
tyrants.
These tyrants, living solely on plunder, and on the labor of their
slaves, and applying all their energies to the seizure of still more plunder,
and the enslavement of still other defenseless persons; increasing, too, their
numbers, perfecting their organizations, and multiplying their weapons of war,
they extend their conquests until, in order to hold what they have already got,
it becomes necessary for them to act systematically, and cooperate with each
other in holding their slaves in subjection.
But all this they can do only by establishing what they call a
government, and making what they call laws.
All the great governments of the world --- those now
existing, as well as those that have passed away --- have been of
this character. They have been mere bands of robbers, who have associated for
purposes of plunder, conquest, and the enslavement of their fellow men. And
their laws, as they have called them, have been only such agreements as they
have found it necessary to enter into, in order to maintain their
organizations, and act together in plundering and enslaving others, and in
securing to each his agreed share of the spoils.
All these laws have had no more real obligation than have the
agreements that brigands, bandits, and pirates find it necessary to enter into
with each other, for the more successful accomplishment of their crimes, and
the more peaceable division of their spoils.
Thus substantially all the legislation of the world has had its
origin in the desires of one class --- of persons to plunder and
enslave others, and hold them as property.
Section III.
In process of time, the robber, or slaveholding,
class --- who had seized all the lands, and held all the means of
creating wealth --- began to discover that the easiest mode of
managing their slaves, and making them profitable, was not for
each slaveholder to hold his specified number of slaves, as he had done before,
and as he would hold so many cattle, but to give them so much liberty as would
throw upon themselves (the slaves) the responsibility of their own subsistence,
and yet compel them to sell their labor to the land-holding
class --- their former owners --- for just what the latter
might choose to give them.
Of course, these liberated slaves, as some have erroneously
called them, having no lands, or other property, and no means of obtaining an
independent subsistence, had no alternative --- to save themselves
from starvation --- but to sell their labor to the landholders, in
exchange only for the coarsest necessaries of life; not always for so much even
as that.
These liberated slaves, as they were called, were now scarcely
less slaves than they were before. Their means of subsistence were perhaps even
more precarious than when each had his own owner, who had an interest to
preserve his life. They were liable, at the caprice or interest of the landholders,
to be thrown out of home, employment, and the opportunity of even earning a
subsistence by their labor. They were, therefore, in large numbers, driven to
the necessity of begging, stealing, or starving; and became, of course,
dangerous to the property and quiet of their late masters.
The consequence was, that these late owners found it necessary,
for their own safety and the safety of their property, to organize themselves
more perfectly as a government and make laws for keeping these
dangerous people in subjection; that is, laws fixing the prices at which
they should be compelled to labor, and also prescribing fearful punishments,
even death itself, for such thefts and trespasses as they were driven to
commit, as their only means of saving themselves from starvation.
These laws have continued in force for hundreds, and, in some
countries, for thousands of years; and are in force today, in greater or less
severity, in nearly all the countries on the globe.
The purpose and effect of these laws have been to maintain, in
the hands of the robber, or slaveholding class, a monopoly of all lands, and,
as far as possible, of all other means of creating wealth; and thus to keep the
great body of laborers in such a state of poverty and dependence, as would compel
them to sell their labor to their tyrants for the lowest prices at which life
could be sustained.
The result of all this is, that the little wealth there is in
the world is all in the hands of a few --- that is, in the hands of
the law-making, slave-holding class; who are now as many slaveholders in spirit
as they ever were, but who accomplish their purposes by means of the
laws they make for keeping the laborers in subjection and dependence,
instead of each one's owning his individual slaves as so many chattels.
Thus the whole business of legislation, which has now grown to
such gigantic proportions, had its origin in the conspiracies, which have
always existed among the few, for the purpose of holding the many in
subjection and extorting from them their labor, and all the profits of their
labor.
And the real motives and spirit which lie at the foundation of
all legislation --- notwithstanding all the pretenses and disguises
by which they attempt to hide themselves --- are the same today as
they always have been. The whole purpose of this legislation is simply to keep
one class of men in subordination and servitude to another.
Section IV.
What, then, is legislation? It is an assumption by one man, or
body of men, of absolute, irresponsible dominion over all other men whom they
call subject to their power. It is the assumption by one man, or body of men,
of a right to subject all other men to their will and their service. It is
the assumption by one man, or body of men, of a right to abolish outright all
the natural rights, all the natural liberty of all other men; to make all other
men their slaves; to arbitrarily dictate to all other men what they may, and
may not, do; what they may, and may not, have; what they may, and may not, be.
It is, in short, the assumption of a right to banish the principle of human
rights, the principle of justice itself, from off the earth, and set up their
own personal will, pleasure, and interest in its place. All this, and nothing
less, is involved in the very idea that there can be any such thing as human
legislation that is obligatory upon those upon whom it is imposed.
NOTES
1. Sir William Jones, an English judge in India, and one of the
most learned judges that ever lived learned in Asiatic as well as European law says: "It is pleasing to remark the similarity, or, rather, the identity,
of those conclusions which pure, unbiased reason, in all ages and
nations, seldom fails to draw, in such juridical inquiries as are not
fettered and manacled by positive institutions." --- Jones
on Bailments, 133.
He means here to say that, when no law has been made in
violation of justice, judicial tribunals, "in all ages and nations,"
have "seldom" failed to agree as to what justice is.